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On the measurement of the overall degree of income stratification between groups 
This is the peer reviewed version of the article: “On the measurement of the overall degree of income 
stratification between groups”, which has been accepted for publication in the Review of Income and 
Wealth. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and 
Conditions for Self-Archiving." 
Abstract: This paper proposes a new class of indices that measure overall stratification 
between groups in a population and can be decomposed as population-weighted averages of 
pairwise indices. The indices capture not only the extent to which groups form well-defined 
strata in the income distribution but also the scale of the resultant differences in equally 
distributed equivalent incomes between them, where these two factors play the same role as 
identification and alienation respectively in the measurement of polarisation. The properties 
of the class as a whole are investigated as well as those of selected members of it: zeroth and 
first power indices may be interpreted as measuring the overall incidence and depth of 
stratification respectively, while second and higher power indices members are directly 
sensitive to the severity of stratification between groups. An illustrative application provides 
an empirical analysis of global income stratification by regions in 1993. 
 
Keywords: income stratification, between-group inequality, polarisation 
JEL codes: D31, D63 
 
1. Introduction 
The concept of stratification is deeply embedded within sociology, most notably in relation to 
the analysis of social class, but has only been of relatively recent concern within the 
economics literature. Thus Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) in their seminal article quote a 
definition by the sociologist Lasswell (1965, p.10): “In its general meaning a stratum is a 
horizontal layer, usually thought of as between, above or below other such layers or strata. 
Stratification is the process of forming observable layers, or the state of being comprised of 
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layers.” Key to this definition is the idea that stratification, unlike segregation, implies a 
hierarchical ordering of groups according to some metric that in many economic settings may 
be used to also quantify the scale of the resultant differences in outcomes between groups. 
For example, occupational segregation in a labour market context will only lead to 
stratification in the earnings distribution if one group is crowded into lower paid occupations, 
with the resultant scale of economic disadvantage due to employment discrimination 
depending not only on the degree of segregation but also on the size of occupational pay 
differentials. Conversely, direct wage discrimination may not lead to significant stratification 
if groups are distributed equally among higher and lower paid occupations. 
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a class of stratification indices that 
depend in general on both the extent to which groups form well-defined layers or strata in the 
distribution of some economic outcome and the scale of between-group differences in those 
outcomes, since both are necessary consequences of the process of stratification.
1
 Our 
approach is based on the measurement of stratification in terms of the impact on between-
group inequality (see Milanovic and Yitzhaki, 2002; Monti and Santoro, 2011), yielding 
indices that may be used to judge not only whether the overall level of stratification is higher 
in one population than another but can also be decomposed to yield unique estimates of the 
contribution of each pair of groups to overall stratification. In contrast, Yitzhaki and Lerman 
(1991) measure stratification in terms of the impact of overlapping on inequality within 
groups, proposing a set of group-specific indices that capture each group’s stratification with 
respect to the rest of the population but fail to provide a measure of the overall degree of 
stratification between groups in the population. The closely related group-specific indices in 
Yitzhaki (1994) are decomposable as weighted sums of pairwise indices that measure the 
                                                          
1
 For expositional purposes we refer to “income stratification” though the measures are 
equally applicable to consumption, wealth or earnings. 
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degree of ‘overlapping’ of one group by another, but the asymmetry of the ‘overlapping’ 
concept makes intepretation of the indices problematic in terms of evaluating the overall 
degree of stratification. For example, in a population composed of only two groups then the 
first group can form a distinct stratum even if the second does not, where this will be the case 
if all first group incomes are concentrated at a point in the support of the second group 
distribution. 
The proposed class of indices are specified as population-weighted averages of the 
degree of stratification between all pairs of groups in the population of interest. Pairwise 
stratification is defined in turn as the product of an ‘identification index’ and an ‘alienation 
function’, where the terminology is borrowed from the analogous literature on polarisation 
(see Esteban and Ray, 1994; Duclos et al., 2004). The identification index captures the extent 
to which two groups constitute distinct strata in their combined income distribution and is 
defined as the difference in the probabilities that a randomly selected member of the more 
affluent group has a higher rather than a lower income than a randomly chosen member of the 
less affluent group. The alienation function is specified as a power function of the absolute 
difference in equally distributed equivalent (ede) incomes between the two groups, with this 
being set equal to one by definition if the value of the power or exponent is set equal to zero. 
As with Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty measures (Foster et al., 1984), the 
choice of power determines the interpretation of the resultant indices. In particular, zeroth 
power indices provide ‘headcount’ measures that reflect the odds that the richer of a 
randomly chosen pair of individuals will come from the more affluent group of which they 
are members. First power indices provide ‘stratification gap’ measures that further take into 
account the depth of stratification as measured by the absolute differences in ede incomes 
between groups. Stratification gap indices have a simple graphical representation using 
familiar tools from stochastic dominance analysis, reducing to twice the between-group 
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absolute Gini coefficient in welfare levels if there is no overlapping of group income 
distributions. Finally, second and higher integer power indices measure alienation as convex 
functions of pairwise ede income gaps and are therefore also sensitive to the distribution of 
ede income gaps over pairs of groups. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the proposed class of 
stratification indices and discusses both the general properties of the class and the specific 
attributes of headcount, stratification gap and higher power indices. Section 3 provides an 
empirical illustration based on the Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) analysis of world 
inequality in 1993 by regions. The final section summarises the contribution and offers some 
suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Definition and properties of the class of stratification indices 
We consider a population divided into K≥2 mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups that are 
ordered by ede income (as defined in (4) below) from the least to the most affluent group. 
The population and population share of group k (k=1,…K) are given as kn  and k kp n N  
respectively, where 
1
K
kk
N n

  is the total size of the population. Let kY  denote the 
income variable of group k with cumulative distribution function ( ) ( ) k kF y P Y y , 
density function ( )kf y  and inverse distribution or quantile function 
1( )kF q .
2
 The expected 
value, income share and ede income of group k are given as k , ks  and k  respectively. The 
population distribution function is written as 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
K
u u k kk
F y P Y y p F y

   , where 
1 2  u KY Y Y Y  is the union of all groups, with expected value 1
K
u k kk
p 

 . The 
ranking of group k incomes in the group l and population distributions are given as 
                                                          
2
 ( )kF y  is assumed to be strictly increasing and continuous for notational convenience, 
implying that the probability of a randomly chosen member of group k having the same 
income as a randomly selected member of group l will have measure zero. The treatment of 
ties is discussed in the next sub-section. 
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1( ( ))l kF F q  and 
1( ( ))u kF F q  respectively, with corresponding mean (fractional) ranks klF  
and kuF . P( ) kl k lF Y Y  is the probability that the income of a random member of group k 
is greater than that of a random member of group l, where this is equal to the probability of 
transvariation (Gini, 1916; see Montanari, 2004) if group l is more affluent than group k. If 
two or more groups have identical ede incomes then they are ranked such that 
P( ) 0.5 P( )   l k k lY Y Y Y  for all relevant pairwise comparisons, where this secondary 
criterion for ranking distributions will generate a transitive ordering if the probability 
relationship between the sub-set of groups exhibits mutual rank transitivity (see De Baets et 
al., 2010).3 Finally if the two distributions cannot be ranked on the basis of either criteria (e.g. 
if the two income distributions are identical) then the various indices to be considered below 
are invariant to the ordering of the groups, which is therefore chosen arbitrarily. 
 
2.1 The measurement of pairwise stratification 
Pairwise stratification  ,klS    between groups k and l is taken to depend in general on 
both the extent to which the two groups occupy well-defined strata in their combined income 
distribution and the scale of the between-group difference in ede incomes. Specifically, we 
define  ,klS    as the product of an identification index klI  and an alienation function 
 ,klA   : 
   , , ; , 1,.... kl kl klS I A k l K     (1) 
where the specification and interpretation of klI  and  ,klA    are discussed in turn below. 
                                                          
3
 Note that ( ) 0.5  kk k kF P Y Y  by definition. The need for the transitivity condition 
arises iff there are more than two groups with the same ede income given that P( ) 0.5l kY Y   
and P( ) 0.5m lY Y   does not necessarily imply P( ) 0.5m kY Y  . The empirical significance of 
the issue is likely to be limited but the condition can always be checked should the need arise. 
Ranking groups in ascending order of average ranks in the overall distribution may not be 
sufficient to order groups that are distinguishable on a pairwise basis since ku luF F  does not 
imply P( ) 0.5k lY Y  . 
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The pairwise identification index klI  in (1) is defined as: 
    
          
     
sgn( ) P P
sgn( ) P 0.5P P 0.5P
sgn( ) 1 2 P 0.5P
kl l k k l
l k l k k l l k
k l l k
I l k Y Y Y Y
l k Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
l k Y Y Y Y
    
        
     
 (2) 
where  
1 0
sgn 0 0
1 0
 

   
  
if l k
l k if l k
if l k
 (2a) 
klI  is thus equal to the signed difference in the probabilities that a randomly chosen member 
of group l will be better rather than worse off than a randomly selected member of group k, 
such that 0 kk llI I  by definition and the use of the sign function ensures that kl lkI I  for 
all k l . klI  is defined for both continuous and discrete income distributions with the 
second line of (2) making explicit the treatment of ties in the case that  P 0 k lY Y , where 
this will be a real issue if the income variable is categorical rather than continuous. klI  can 
always be computed from individual income data by the simple enumeration of cases with 
k ln n  comparisons between members of the two groups in total. If the income variable is 
continuous then  1 2kl klI F   from the final line of (2), where klF  can be calculated as 
the average fractional rank of group k incomes in the group income l distribution. 
The index klI  is equal to both the ‘economic distance ratio’ D0 in Dagum (1980) and 
the first-order ‘discrimination index’ 1  in Le Breton et al. (2008) if group l is the more 
affluent of the two groups, and has also been identified in this case with the ‘loss of between-
group inequality due to overlapping’ (Monti and Santoro, 2011). Its interpretation as an 
identification or classification index follows from the observation that if individuals from the 
two groups are randomly matched with each other then klI  will reflect the success with 
which group identity can be correctly determined by assuming that the better off individual 
within each pair will be from the more rather than less affluent group (see Montanari, 2004). 
klI  will take its maximum value of one if group identity can be determined with certainty by 
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this rule, which will only be the case if the poorest member of the more affluent group is 
better off than any member of the less affluent group: not only will everyone from the more 
affluent group be among the richest people in the two groups but also all the richest people 
will be from the more affluent group. Conversely, klI  will equal zero if the income 
distributions of the two groups are identical such that the pairwise identification rule is 
entirely uninformative of group identity: the richer person in any pair is equally likely to be 
from one group as the other if the two groups are indistinguishable in terms of incomes. klI  
can also be negative, which will be the case if the richer individual is more likely to be from 
the less rather than the more affluent group, taking its minimum value when all but one 
person in the more affluent group is worse off than everybody in the less affluent group. 
The alienation function  ,klA    in (1) is defined as: 
     , ; 0; 0 1kl l kA for

             (3a) 
 , 1; 0; 0 1klA for        (3b) 
where the absolute difference in ede incomes    l k     provides a measure of the 
‘economic distance’ between the two groups (Shorrocks, 1982), with Chakravarty and Dutta 
(1987) showing under certain mild restrictions that only positive multiples of this measure 
can reflect differences in the average welfare of the two groups. If 0   then  ,klA    is 
given as a power function of    l k     and can thus be interpreted as an indicator of 
the degree of ‘alienation’ between the two groups, with the parameter   reflecting the degree 
of aversion to differences in average welfare levels between groups. For example, if the 
difference in average welfare between two groups doubles then there will be 2  times the 
level of alienation between them. Alternatively,   is the elasticity of alienation with respect 
to the average welfare gap, so that a 1% increase in the gap leads to a % increase in 
between-group alienation.  ,klA    is strictly increasing in    l k     if 0  , with 
 , 0klA     if ede incomes in the two groups are the same. If 0   then  0, 1klA    by 

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definition and the scale of average welfare differences between groups is not of itself a matter 
of concern. 
 Ede incomes  g   are in turn defined as generalised or  order means: 
 
1
1 0 1; ,
gn
ig
i
g g
g
y
for g k l
n


   
 
 
 
     
 
 
 

 (4a) 
 
1
1
0; ,
g
g
n
n
g g ig
i
y for g k l   

 
    
 
 
  (4b) 
where   may be interpreted as the Atkinson (1970) inequality aversion parameter. 
Blackorby et al. (1981) strongly advocate the use of generalised means as measures of ede 
incomes, with Foster and Szekely (2008) showing them to be the only class of representative 
income indices that satisfy a basic set of properties including subgroup consistency. Thus, if 
the population sizes of the groups are held constant, overall population ede income must rise 
when ede income rises in one group and does not fall in the rest. Given (4), a transfer of 
income from someone in the more affluent group to someone in the less affluent group must 
increase    l k    and hence the level of alienation if 0  . In particular, if 1   and
1   then alienation is, as in Esteban and Ray (1994), equal to the absolute difference in 
mean incomes. 
The parametric class of measures    , ,kl kl klS I A     thus gives analysts and 
policymakers an instrument to evaluate stratification with varying sensitivity to distributional 
issues depending on social preferences. In particular, there seems no reason to believe that 
aversion to individual income inequality and to groupwise alienation will necessarily be the 
same so   and   are treated as independent parameters. For example, income differences 
among men may be acceptable to the extent that these reflect differential rewards for effort, 
whereas those between men and women might not as gender is a matter of circumstance. 
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 ,klS    is symmetric in that    , ,kl lkS S     but it is nevertheless sensitive to the 
ordering of groups by the chosen measure of ede income  g   given the definition of klI  
in (2), providing a ‘directional’ measure in the sense of Dagum (1997). 
 
2.2 Definition and general properties of the class of stratification indices 
The proposed class of stratification indices  ,S    is obtained as a population-weighted 
average of the pairwise indices  ,klS   : 
     
1 1 1 1
, , ,
K K K K
k l kl k l kl kl
k l k l
S p p S p p I A     
   
    (5) 
where k lp p  is the probability that the first of two individuals randomly selected with 
replacement from the population will be from group k and the second from group l, and 
which therefore sum to one over all possible combinations. 
 ,S    will take a value of zero if pairwise stratification between all pairs of groups 
is zero, although this does not necessarily imply that all groupwise income distributions are 
identical. The overall level of stratification  ,S    is strictly increasing in the pairwise 
indices  ,klS   , which provide unique estimates of the contribution of each distinct pair of 
groups to overall stratification. Moreover, the pairwise indices may be meaningfully 
aggregated, given symmetry, to yield estimates    1, ,
K
k k l kll
S p p S   

   of the 
contribution of each group to overall stratification. 
 ,S    is increasing in pairwise identification klI , but identification is inherently a 
characteristic of groups so the impact on klI  of any particular change in individual incomes 
will inevitably depend on the configuration of groups in the population (see Esteban and Ray 
(1994) for further discussion). Consider a population consisting of two or more groups with 
symmetric, unimodal welfare densities with compact supports ( )kf y

 and corresponding 
ede incomes k
 , where these will correspond to income densities and mean incomes for the 
sub-class of indices with 1  , i.e.  ,1S  . We note that a symmetric, ede income-
10 
 
preserving ‘squeeze’ in the welfare distribution of one group, say from ( )kf y
  to ( )kf y
   
as shown in Figure 1a, cannot reduce identification and hence stratification. In contrast, a 
reduction in within-group variation holding between-group differences constant will lead to a 
fall in inequality according to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. 
Figure 1b offers a graphical proof of the identification property that makes use of the 
concept of a ‘λ-squeeze’ defined in Duclos et al. (2004),4 although the argument holds more 
generally for any symmetric ‘squeeze’ operator applied to ( )kf y
 . Let 
   ( ) 1  k k kf y f y        where 0 1  , then ( )kf y   has the same mean 
k
  as ( )kf y

 but is second-order stochastically dominant. Hence, in Figure 1b, 
( ) ( )k kF y F y
  
 if  ky
   and vice versa, where the absolute difference between the two 
distribution functions is symmetric about k
  by construction. Given that the contribution of 
group k to overall stratification is    1, ,
K
k k l kll
S p p S   

  ,  ,S    will not fall 
due to this λ-squeeze if the degree of identification of group k does not fall with respect to 
either more or less affluent groups. We demonstrate that klI will not fall if the reference 
group l is at least as affluent as group k, with extension to the opposite case immediate given 
symmetry of the welfare distributions.
5
 Specifically, for ( ) 0l k
    , we need to show that
0
[ ( ) ( )] ( )2 0

     k k lkl kl F y F y f y yI I
     , where kl klI I
   is a weighted sum of the 
distributional differences at each welfare level with weights given by the group l welfare 
density  lf y . Consider first the limiting case l k    then 0kl klI I    since the 
                                                          
4
 Note that Duclos et al. (2004) apply the ‘λ-squeeze’ to so-called ‘basic densities’ that would 
be fully identified in our framework even before the application of the operator because they 
are assumed to have disjoint supports. 
5
 Le Breton et al. (2008) seek to establish an analogous relationship between second-order 
stochastic dominance and second-order discrimination (i.e. identification in our terminology) 
but only manage to show that it will hold if the density of the reference function  lf y  is 
decreasing over the entire support of ( )kF y

, implying that the group l distribution must be 
positively skewed with mode of zero. 
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weights  lf y  will be symmetric about the common level of ede income, with both 0klI    
and 0klI  . For l k
   , the mode of  lf y  will lie to the right of k , as shown in the 
diagram, and we can proceed as follows. First note that  lf y  is strictly increasing over the 
range ( )k l k
       so    l k l kf w f w      for any pair of points k w   with 
0 ( )l kw
     . Moreover  lf y  is symmetric about l  so    l k l kf w f w      
for any pair of points k w
   for which ( )l kw
    . Hence we can conclude that 
0kl klI I
    since    l k l kf w f w      for all possible w. 
 ,S    is also increasing in alienation between groups  ,klA    if 0  . Given that 
 ,klA    is homogeneous of degree   in the difference in ede incomes, it is apparent that an 
identification-preserving scalar expansion of all welfare differences about the overall 
population ede income u
  will unambiguously increase alienation in any population 
consisting of two or more groups. Figure 2 illustrates this alienation property, which captures 
the idea that stratification is an increasing function of the scale of between-group differences. 
 ,S    is invariant to the permutation of groups and to the replication both of the 
subpopulations within groups (holding the population shares of the groups constant) and of 
the groups (holding the subpopulations within each group constant). However, stratification 
is not independent of the partition of the population into groups. For any given set of K 
groups with fixed income distributions ( )kF y ,  ,S    will be maximised if the population is 
equally divided between the two groups with the largest pairwise index  ,klS   , where this 
pair will typically consist of the most and least affluent groups in the population although this 
need not always be the case. 
 The dominance properties of  ,S    are closely analogous to those of the Duclos et 
al. (2004) polarisation measures, but identification in our approach depends on the extent to 
which group membership can be determined from individuals’ ranks within the income 
distribution, rather than being a function of relative frequencies within income classes or at 
particular levels of income. This difference fundamentally distinguishes our measurement of 
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income stratification between a set of exogenously classified groups from that of income 
polarisation whether with or without predetermined groups. 
 
2.3 Properties of headcount stratification indices  0,S   
The zeroth power member of the class,  0,S  , may be re-written from (5) as: 
      
1 1 1 1
0, sgn( ) P P ;
K K K K
k l kl k l l k k l
k l k l
S p p I p p l k Y Y Y Y
   
        (6) 
where  0,S   is written as a function of   since the value of the index is dependent on the 
ordering of groups by ede income  g  .  0,S   is a unit-free measure that is invariant to 
affine transformations of individual welfare levels.
6
 
  0,S   is a population-weighted average of the pairwise identification indices klI
and may therefore be interpreted as a headcount or incidence measure of stratification. The 
maximum value of  0,S   is  211 K kk p , since 0kkI  by definition for all k. In this 
case there is perfect stratification in the sense of Lasswell (1965), with members of any 
particular group restricted to a single interval or range of ranks in the population income 
distribution that is exclusively occupied by members of their own group. Conversely 
 0, 0S   if group membership is entirely uninformative as a predictor of relative rank in 
which case 0klI  for all pairs of groups, though a zero value may also arise in cases in 
which positive and negative values of the pairwise indices cancel each other out. Negative 
values of  0,S   are also possible if, for example, the income distributions of some groups 
are bimodal although such a result might suggest that one or more of the groups were 
composite in nature.
7
 
                                                          
6
  0,S   is not in general invariant to order-preserving transformations of individual welfare 
levels because these can have an effect on identification through the ordering of groups by 
ede incomes. 
7
 For example, consider a population of size N=14 consisting of three groups k, l, and m with 
incomes Yk={1, 7, 7}; Yl={6, 6, 6, 6}; and Ym={2, 2, 2, 2, 16, 16, 16} such that k l m     
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Dividing  0,S   by  211 K kk p  yields a normalised index  0,S   that is the 
average of the pairwise identification indices between all distinct groups with a maximum 
value of one. In particular,   120,  IS   if the population is composed of only two groups. 
Zhou (2012) has independently proposed a stratification measure SZHOU that is identical to 
 0,S   except that groups are ordered by kuF  alone on the assumption of no ties between 
groups. Zhou defends his choice of measure on the grounds that it is invariant to all rank-
preserving transformations of income but this is achieved by conflating the determination of 
the hierarchical ordering of groups with the measurement of the degree of identification 
between them given that 
1
K
ku l kll
F p F

 .
8
 In our view these are independent steps with 
ede incomes providing a more compelling primary criterion for the establishment of the 
relative economic standing of groups (Chakravarty and Dutta, 1987), with the pairwise 
comparison of ranks in the case of tied groups. 
A small change in the welfare of an individual that leads to a change in the ordering 
of groups by ede incomes may give rise to a discontinuous change in  0,S  , where this 
property is similar to the discontinuity of headcount poverty at the poverty line. With only 
two groups, the reduction in headcount stratification  0,S   caused by a unit increase in the 
welfare of one person would be greatest for members of the less affluent group with incomes 
equal to the modal welfare level in the more affluent group holding the ordering of groups 
constant. With more than two groups, it is readily apparent that increasing the welfare of the 
least affluent group, let alone the welfare of the poorest members of that group, may not 
necessarily have the most impact on headcount stratification: indeed  0,S   is invariant to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
since 5k  , 6l  and 8m . Hence 1/ 3 klI , 5 / 21kmI  and 1/ 7 lmI , since 
 P 2 / 3 k lY Y ,  P 8 / 21 k mY Y  and  P 4 / 7 l mY Y , to give (0,1)S = −3/98. 
8
 Zhou further conjectures that SZHOU≥0 but the previous footnote example yields SZHOU  =
(0,1)S = −3/61 given that  ku lu muF F F  since 
1
37kuNF  
1
27luNF , and 
4
77muNF  . 
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changes in the welfare of individuals in the least affluent group whose welfare is less, and 
remains less, than that of any person in any other group. 
 
2.4 Properties of stratification gap indices  1,S   
The first power member of the class,  1,S  , may be re-written from (5) as: 
   
    
      
1 1
1 1
1, 1,
sgn( ) P P
0, cov 1, ,
K K
k l kl kl
k l
K K
k l l k l k k l
k l
kl kl
S p p A I
p p l k Y Y Y Y
S D A I
 
 
 
  
 
 

     
 

  (7) 
where   1 1
K K
k l l kk l
D p p    
 
    is the population mean ede income gap and 
        1 1cov 1, , 0,
K K
kl kl k l l k klk l
A I p p D I S     
 
      is the population 
covariance between pairwise levels of alienation and identification which will typically be 
positive.  1,S   has the same units as income and is invariant to translations of the welfare 
measure. 
 1,S   reflects not only the incidence but also the depth of stratification and may 
therefore be interpreted as a ‘stratification gap’ measure. For example, the lack of overlap 
between a rich and a poor group will count more towards the ‘stratification gap’ as measured 
by  1,S   than the same lack between two moderately afluent groups: in the limit, two 
groups with identical ede incomes will not contribute to  1,S   irrespective of the degree of 
pairwise identification. 
Let gY  be the smoothed income variable obtained by assigning to each individual in 
the population the mean income of the group to which they belong, with distribution function 
( )gF y . It follows from Allanson (2014) that (1,1) 4cov( , ( )) 2 g u u bS Y F y G , where bG  is the 
Yitzhaki and Lerman (1991) measure of between-group inequality. Moreover if there is no 
overlapping of the groupwise distributions of individual incomes ( )kF y  then 
1 1
(1,1) 4cov( , ( )) (1) 2g g
K K
k l l k u Bk l
S Y F y p p D G  
 
      , where BG  is the conventional 
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between-group Gini index (see, e.g., Mookherjee and Shorrocks, 1982). These 
correspondences suggest a graphical interpretation of  1,1S  based on the generalised 
concentration curve for gY  with respect to individual incomes uY  and the corresponding 
generalised Lorenz curve, ( )gGC Y  and ( )gGL Y  respectively. Figure 3 plots ( )gGC Y  and 
( )gGL Y  as the cumulative mean smoothed income (i.e. cumulated smoothed income divided 
by the total population) of the first 100q per cent of people when ranked from poorest to 
richest in the individual and smoothed income distributions respectively, with  1,1S  equal to 
four times the area A if ( )gGC Y  lies everywhere below the line of equality and where 
( ) ( )g gGC Y GL Y  in the absence of overlapping. More generally,  1,S   is simply twice the 
generalised concentration index of the smoothed distribution gY

 obtained by assigning to 
each individual in the population the ede income g
  of the group to which they belong, i.e. 
 1, 2 4cov( , ( )) u b g u uS G Y F Y
    . 
Normalising each ede income gap by the population-weighted mean ede income gap 
( )D   yields a class of standardised stratification gap measures: 
 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1,
1, ;
( )
K K K K K K
k l l kkl
k l kl kl kl klK K
k l k l k l
k l l k
k l
p pA
S p p I I w I
D
p p
 
 
 


      
 
 
   
  
  

 (8) 
where the weights klw  are non-negative and sum to unity. Thus  1,S   may be interpreted as 
a weighted average identification index like  0,S   but with pairwise weights equal to 
shares in the total ede income gap  ND   rather than in the population N. Like  0,S   
 1,S   is invariant to affine transformations of welfare and also to the replication of 
population by the replication of groups. Allanson (2014) has previously identified  1,1S as 
the ratio of bG  to BG , generalising the result in Monti and Santoro (2011) to two or more 
groups, with Heller and Yitzhaki (2006) interpreting this ratio as a measure of the ‘quality of 
identification’ achieved in the classification of individual groups by means of some 
continuous characteristic. Hence  1,1S  is equal to the ratio of area A to (A+B) in Figure 3. 
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 1,S   is continuous since  1,klA   tends to zero for any pair of groups as the 
difference in ede incomes between them tends to zero. Increasing the welfare of members of 
the least affluent group will have the most impact on the mean ede income gap  D   but not 
necessarily on the stratification gap  1,S   as this will also depend on the levels of and 
resultant changes in pairwise identification between groups. For the specific index  1,1S , 
the minimum cost of eliminating alienation through a policy of group-specific lump sum 
transfers will be equal to  k K kk K n     if transfers were perfectly targeted, i.e. the sum 
over all but the richest group of the product of group size and the mean income gap with the 
richest group. 
 
2.5 Properties of  ,S    with 1   
All indices  ,S    with 1   have alienation functions that are convex functions of 
pairwise ede income gaps and are therefore directly sensitive to the distribution of gaps 
among pairs of groups. For example, consider a population consisting of three equal sized 
groups with 12 23I I , i.e. the middle group is equally identified with respect to the two other 
groups. It then follows from Jensen’s inequality that stratification will be minimised if 
2 1 3 2
         , i.e. the ede income of the middle group is also equidistant between 
those of the two other groups. By implication, stratification will be higher in this population 
the closer the ede income of the middle group to that of either the most or the least affluent 
group, holding identification constant. 
Thus  ,S    reflects not only the incidence and depth but also the severity of 
stratification if 1  . In particular, if 2   then the alienation function is equal to the 
squared ede income gap and one pair of groups with ede incomes twice as far apart as another 
pair will contribute four times as much to  2,S   holding identification equal. Higher 
values of   imply greater alienation aversion: in the limit as   then the value of the 
index will be dominated by the pairwise stratification between the most and least affluent 
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groups, with the latter group − though not necessarily the poorest members of it − providing 
the most cost-effective target for an anti-stratification support policy. 
 
3. Empirical illustration. 
By way of illustration, this section follows Allanson (2014) in further elaborating the 
empirical analysis presented in Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) of world inequality by regions 
in 1993.
9
 The top panel in Table 1 presents estimates from their Tables 4 and 7 of population 
shares, kp ; mean incomes, k ; and mean rankings in the income distributions of each 
region,  kl k lF P Y Y  , and the world  ku k uF P Y Y  . This shows that Africa was the 
poorest region in per capita terms followed by Asia; Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union (EFSU); Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); and Western Europe/North 
America/Oceania (WENAO). However the mean rank of Africans in the Asian income 
distribution was 0.515, implying that an African chosen at random was likely to have been 
better off than a randomly chosen Asian, and the mean rank of Africans in the world 
distribution was also higher than that of Asians. Ranks for all other pairs of regions are 
consistent with the ordering of mean incomes. 
The remaining panels show the constituent elements of the stratification indices as 
defined in (5), with the stratification indices themselves given in Table 2. Note that the 
population weights k lp p  reflect the relative frequencies of regional pairs and sum across 
columns to give the population shares kp , with the sum of weights not on the leading 
diagonal  211 K kk p =0.603. The pattern of pairwise identification indices klI  and absolute 
mean income differences l k   reveals that the regions of the world are broadly divided 
into three broad layers or strata – with Africa and Asia at the bottom, EFSU and LAC in the 
middle and WENAO on its own at the top of the world income distribution –where the degree 
of both identification and alienation between regions in the same layer was much lower than 
                                                          
9
 These regions are referred to as ‘continents’ in Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) though the 
correspondence is not exact. 
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that between regions in different strata. Indeed, there was virtually no stratification of the 
African and Asian distributions in the bottom stratum nor of the EFSU and LAC distributions 
in the middle layer, with pairwise identification indices close to zero and mean income 
differences less than $1000. In contrast, the WENAO income distribution was highly 
stratified from those of every other region, with the relevant pairwise identification indices 
ranging between 0.656 and 0.902 and all mean income differences greater than twice the 
mean world income level of $3000. All other cross-pairwise measures were intermediate with 
the population-weighted mean identification index and mean income gap equal to 0.312 and 
$2415 respectively: in particular, the pairwise identification of the EFSU and Asian 
distributions was above average even though the mean income difference between the two 
regions was not much larger than that between EFSU and LAC. 
 The top panel of Table 2 reports the headcount index (0,1)S , which is equal to the 
population-weighted mean identification index reported in Table 1. Thus the difference in the 
probabilities that the richer of two randomly chosen individuals will come from the richer 
rather than the poorer region of which they are inhabitants was equal to 0.312, or 
0.518=0.312/0.603 conditional on the two individuals being from different regions. It 
follows from (1) that the population-weighted mean probability of transvariation (between 
distinct regions) was equal to 0.241=(1−0.518)/2, i.e. there was a roughly one in four chance 
that a randomly chosen individual from a poorer region would be better off than a randomly 
chosen individual from a richer region. The pairwise decomposition shows that the overall 
level of identification was mainly driven by the existence of the largely separate WENAO 
stratum at the top of the world income distribution, with the Asia/WENAO pair alone 
contribute nearly half (0.474=0.074+0.074)/0.312) of the total value of (0,1)S  as a result 
of the populousness of the two regions and the low degree of overlap between their income 
distributions. At the other extreme, the EFSU/LAC and Africa/Asia pairs made a negligible 
contribution to the total due to the lack of pairwise identification of their income distributions, 
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with the negative value for the latter arising because the probability of transvariation between 
the two regions, i.e.  Africa AsiaP Y Y , was greater than 0.5. 
 The second panel reports the stratification gap index (1,1)S , which may loosely be 
interpreted as a measure of the perceived average difference in mean incomes between 
regions based on individuals’ actual positions in the world income distribution. Thus the 
stratification gap of $1873 may be compared to the mean income gap  1D  of $2415 reported 
in Table 1, with the difference of $542 reflecting the imperfect identification of regions in the 
world income distribution. Alternatively, following Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002), this 
difference represents twice the loss of absolute between-group inequality due to the 
overlapping of regional income distributions since  1 2 u BD G  and (1,1) 2 u bS G . In 
comparison to (0,1)S , WENAO accounts for an even larger share of the total value of the 
index as a result of the above-average mean income differences between WENAO and every 
other region in the world. Conversely the shares of the “middle income” regions, EFSU and 
LAC, fall particularly sharply as a result of their intermediate position in the world income 
distribution and correspondingly smaller mean income differences with other regions. 
 The standardised stratification gap index (1,1)S  reported in the next panel was 0.775. 
Like (0,1)S , (1,1)S  may be interpreted as a weighted average identification index but with 
total income gap rather than population weights. Given that 
   (1,1) (0,1) cov( 1,1 1 , )  kl klS S A D I , the larger value of (1,1)S  reflects the positive 
correlation between pairwise mean income gaps and identification indices, i.e. region pairs 
that formed more clearly defined regional strata in their combined income distribution also 
tended to have had larger differences in mean incomes. The value of the index may also be 
identified, following Allanson (2014), as the ratio of bG  to BG , with 0.775=1873/2415. The 
pairwise decomposition is identical to that given in Allanson (2014) and yields the same 
relative contributions as those for (1,1)S . 
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 The final panel reports the squared stratification gap (2,1)S , with the value of 14.3 
million implying a root mean squared stratification gap of $3782. The squared measure puts 
greater weight on the larger income gaps compared to (1,1)S  leading, as expected, to 
increases in the relative contributions of the regions at the top and bottom of the world 
income distribution – WENAO, Africa and Asia – at the expense of those in the middle – 
EFSU and LAC. Higher power indices (i.e. with 2)   would place increasingly greater 
weight on the relative contributions of the regions at the top and bottom of the world income 
distribution, with the pairwise stratification between the poorest and richest regions 
dominating the value of the index in the limit. 
 Overall the various indices all portray a broadly similar picture of the pattern of 
stratification given that the correlation coefficient between the pairwise identification indices 
and mean income gaps was equal to 0.735. We have argued that stratification necessarily 
results in both pairwise identification and alienation so this positive correlation is to be 
expected although the strength of the association will likely differ depending on the specific 
context. Recalling that a ceteris paribus increase in within-group inequality will (typically) 
reduce stratification, the combination in some poorer Asian countries, most notably China 
and India, of high per capita growth rates and the emergence of prosperous middle classes 
may be expected to have reduced overall levels of both alienation and identification between 
regions in more recent years. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper offers a new class of parametric indices that is based on a conceptualisation of 
stratification as a process that results in a hierarchical ordering of groups and therefore seeks 
to capture not only the extent to which groups form well-defined layers or strata in the 
income distribution but also the scale of the resultant differences in ede incomes between 
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them. The indices provide measures of the overall degree of stratification between two or 
more groups in a population, where the dominance properties of the indices are similar to 
those of the Duclos et al. (2004) polarisation measures. First the identification property 
distinguishes stratification from inequality since an ede income-preserving “squeeze” in the 
welfare distribution of one group cannot reduce identification under certain specified 
conditions whereas it will lead to a fall in inequality according to the Pigou-Dalton transfer 
principle. More straightforwardly, an identification-preserving scalar expansion of all welfare 
differences about the overall population ede income will unambiguously increase alienation 
between groups. Finally stratification will typically be maximised if the population is equally 
divided between the most and least affluent groups. However it is important to recognise that 
stratification is not the same as polarisation due to the fundamentally different 
characterisations of identification employed in the two sets of measures, with an axiomatic 
derivation of the proposed class of stratification measures remaining a topic for further 
research. The link between the stratification gap index and the generalised concentration 
index further suggests that it may be possible to establish welfare foundations for at least 
some members of the new class of indices. 
The proposed class of measures benefit from their ease of interpretation and practical 
utility. In particular, the headcount and gap indices reflect the incidence and depth of 
stratification: the former reflects the odds that the richer of any randomly chosen pair of 
individuals is a member of the more affluent group from which they are drawn, while the 
latter may be interpreted as a measure of the perceived average difference in ede incomes 
between groups based on individuals’ actual positions in the overall income distribution. 
Each index is a population-weighted average of pairwise indices so it is possible to judge not 
only whether the overall level of stratification is higher in one population compared to 
another but also to estimate the contribution of individual groups to observed levels of overall 
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stratification, with the further potential to identify the characteristics or factors that contribute 
to stratification. Reporting a range of measures rather than just one enables a fuller 
characterisation of the nature of stratification as shown by the illustrative study of global 
stratification in this paper. Estimation and inference procedures remain an issue for future 
work, with the estimation techniques set out in Frick et al. (2006) offering one possible 
approach based on U-statistics. Given suitable procedures, it would be of interest to examine 
changes in global stratification over time as well as consider applications to a range of other 
socioeconomic phenomena such as the racial wage hierarchy in South Africa and gender pay 
differentials in earnings. 
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Table 1. Constituent elements of income stratification calculations 
 
Pop
n
 
share 
(%) 
Mean 
income 
($PPP) Mean rank in income distribution of: 
Column (l) 
Row (k)   
Africa 
 
Asia 
 
EFSU 
 
LAC 
 
WENAO 
 
World 
 
Africa 10.0 1310.0 0.500 0.515 0.275 0.261 0.049 0.407 
Asia 59.5 1594.6 0.485 0.500 0.265 0.247 0.064 0.397 
EFSU 7.8 2780.9 0.725 0.735 0.500 0.483 0.136 0.609 
LAC 8.4 3639.8 0.739 0.753 0.517 0.500 0.172 0.629 
WENAO 14.3 10012.4 0.951 0.936 0.864 0.828 0.500 0.861 
World 100.0 3031.8      0.500 
   Population weights: k lp p  Sum 
Africa   0.010 0.060 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.100 
Asia   0.060 0.354 0.046 0.050 0.085 0.595 
EFSU   0.008 0.046 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.078 
LAC   0.008 0.050 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.084 
WENAO   0.014 0.085 0.011 0.012 0.020 0.143 
World        1.000 
Pairwise identification indices: klI  
Weighted
mean 
Africa   0 -0.030 0.450 0.478 0.902 0.186 
Asia   -0.030 0 0.470 0.506 0.872 0.201 
EFSU   0.450 0.470 0 0.034 0.728 0.431 
LAC   0.478 0.506 0.034 0 0.656 0.445 
WENAO   0.902 0.872 0.728 0.656 0 0.721 
World        0.312 
   Absolute mean income gaps: l k   
Weighted
mean 
Africa   0 284.6 1470.9 2329.8 8702.4 1722.3 
Asia   284.6 0 1186.3 2045.2 8417.8 1494.8 
EFSU   1470.9 1186.3 0 858.9 7231.5 1957.5 
LAC   2329.8 2045.2 858.9 0 6372.6 2426.4 
WENAO   8702.4 8417.8 7231.5 6372.6 0 6980.1 
World        2415.0 
Notes: Top panel. Source: Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002) Tables 4 and 7 - see also Table 1 for the list of 
countries in each region (EFSU – Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union; LAC – Latin America and 
Caribbean; WENAO – Western Europe, North America and Oceania). Other panels. Author’s own calculations.  
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Table 2. Income stratification between regions of the world 
  Africa Asia EFSU LAC WENAO Sum Share 
Headcount stratification 
Africa  0 -0.0018 0.0035 0.0040 0.0129 0.019 6.0% 
Asia  -0.0018 0 0.0218 0.0254 0.0740 0.119 38.2% 
EFSU  0.0035 0.0218 0 0.0002 0.0081 0.034 10.8% 
LAC  0.0040 0.0254 0.0002 0 0.0079 0.038 12.0% 
WENAO  0.0129 0.0740 0.0081 0.0079 0 0.103 33.0% 
 S 0,1        0.312  
Stratification gap $PPP  
Africa  0 -0.5 5.2 9.4 112.3 126.4 6.7% 
Asia  -0.5 0 25.8 51.9 623.1 700.3 37.4% 
EFSU  5.2 25.8 0 0.2 58.6 89.8 4.8% 
LAC  9.4 51.9 0.2 0 50.3 111.8 6.0% 
WENAO  112.3 623.1 58.6 50.3 0 844.2 45.1% 
 S 1,1        1872.5  
Standardised stratification gap   
Africa  0 -0.0002 0.0021 0.0039 0.0465 0.052 6.7% 
Asia  -0.0002 0 0.0107 0.0215 0.2580 0.290 37.4% 
EFSU  0.0021 0.0107 0 0.0001 0.0242 0.037 4.8% 
LAC  0.0039 0.0215 0.0001 0 0.0208 0.046 6.0% 
WENAO  0.0465 0.2580 0.0242 0.0208 0 0.350 45.1% 
 S 1,1        0.775  
Squared stratification gap ($PPP/1000)
2
 
Africa  0.0 -0.0001 0.0076 0.0219 0.9774 1.007 7.1% 
Asia  -0.0001 0.0 0.0307 0.1061 5.2449 5.382 37.7% 
EFSU  0.0076 0.0307 0.0 0.0002 0.4234 0.462 3.2% 
LAC  0.0219 0.1061 0.0002 0.0 0.3206 0.449 3.1% 
WENAO  0.9774 5.2449 0.4234 0.3206 0.0 6.966 48.8% 
 S 2,1        14.265  
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
  
27 
 
Figure 1a. Illustration of ede income-preserving squeeze of group k welfare distribution 
 
 
Figure 1b. Graphical proof of the identification property 
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Figure 2. Illustration of alienation axiom 
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of  1,1S  
 
 
